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A fundamental task in modern cryptography is the joint computation of a function which has two
inputs, one from Alice and one from Bob, such that neither of the two can learn more about the
other’s input than what is implied by the value of the function. In this Letter, we show that any
quantum protocol for the computation of a classical deterministic function that outputs the result to
both parties (two-sided computation) and that is secure against a cheating Bob can be completely
broken by a cheating Alice. Whereas it is known that quantum protocols for this task cannot be
completely secure, our result implies that security for one party implies complete insecurity for the
other. Our findings stand in stark contrast to recent protocols for weak coin tossing, and highlight
the limits of cryptography within quantum mechanics. We remark that our conclusions remain
valid, even if security is only required to be approximate and if the function that is computed for
Bob is different from that of Alice.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Hk
Traditionally, cryptography has been understood as
the art of “secret writing“, i.e., of sending messages se-
curely from one party to another. Today, the research
field of cryptography comprises much more than encryp-
tion and studies all aspects of secure communication and
computation among players that do not trust each other,
including tasks such as electronic voting and auctioning.
Following the excitement that the exchange of quantum
particles may allow for the distribution of a key that
is unconditionally secure [BB84, Eke91], a level of secu-
rity unattainable by classical means, the question arose
whether other fundamental cryptographic tasks could
be implemented with the same level of security using
quantum mechanical effects. For oblivious transfer and
bit commitment, it was shown that the answer is nega-
tive [LC97, May97]. Interestingly, however, a weak ver-
sion of a coin toss can be implemented by quantum me-
chanical means [Moc07].
In this Letter we study the task of secure two-party
computation. Here, two mistrustful players, Alice and
Bob, wish to compute the value of a classical determin-
istic function f , which takes an input u from Alice and
v from Bob, in such a way that both learn the result of
the computation and that none of the parties can learn
more about the other’s input, even by deviating from the
protocol. As our main result we show that any quantum
protocol which is secure against a cheating Bob can be
completely broken by a cheating Alice. Formally, we de-
sign an attack by Alice which allows her to compute the
value of the function f for all of her inputs (rather than
only a single one, which would be required from a secure
protocol).
Our result strengthens the impossibility result for two-
sided secure two-party computation by Colbeck, where
he showed that Alice can always obtain more informa-
tion about Bob’s input than what is implied by the value
of the function [Col07]. In a similar way, we complement
a result by Salvail, Schaffner and Sota´kova´ [SSS09] show-
ing that any quantum protocol for a non-trivial primitive
necessarily leaks information to a dishonest player. Our
result is motivated by Lo’s impossibility result for the
case where only Alice obtains the result of the function
(one-sided computation) [Lo97]. Lo’s approach is based
on the idea that Bob does not have any output; hence,
his quantum state cannot depend on Alice’s input. Then,
Bob has learned nothing about Alice’s input and a cheat-
ing Alice can therefore still change her input value (by
purifying the protocol) and thus cheat.
In the two-sided case, this approach to proving the
insecurity of two-party computation fails as Bob knows
the value of the function and has thus some information
about Alice’s input. In order to overcome this problem
we develop a new approach. We start with a formal defi-
nition of security based on the standard real/ideal-world
paradigm from modern cryptography. In our case of a
classical functionality, this definition guarantees the ex-
istence of a classical input for Bob in the ideal world,
even if he is, in the real world, dishonestly purifying his
steps of the protocol. Since real and ideal are indistin-
guishable for a secure protocol and since a purification
of the classical input cannot be part of Bob’s systems,
Alice can now obtain a copy of this input by applying a
unitary—constructed with help of Uhlmann’s theorem—
to her output registers and, henceforth, break the proto-
col.
We wish to emphasize that the above conclusion re-
mains valid if the protocol is not required to be perfectly
secure (nor perfectly correct). More precisely, if the pro-
tocol is secure up to a small error against cheating Bob,
then Alice is able to compute the value of the function for
all of her inputs with only a small error. Since the error
is independent of the number of inputs that both Alice
and Bob have, our analysis improves over Lo’s result in
the one-sided case. In fact, our results apply to this case
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2since, more generally, they remain true should Bob re-
ceive the output of a function g, different from Alice’s f ,
as a careful look at our argument reveals.
Security Definition. Alice and Bob, at distant loca-
tions and only connected with a quantum channel, wish
to execute a protocol that takes an input u from Alice
and an input v from Bob and that outputs the value
f(u, v) of a classical deterministic function f to both of
them. Since Alice does not trust Bob, she wants to be
sure that the protocol does not allow him to extract more
information about her input than what is implied by the
output value of the function. The same should be true if
Alice is cheating and Bob is honest. Whereas for simple
functions this intuitive notion of security can be made
precise by stating a list of security requirements for cer-
tain quantum states of Alice and Bob, such an approach
seems very complicated and prone to pitfalls for general
functions f , in particular, if we want to consider pro-
tocols that are only approximately secure. We therefore
follow the modern literature on cryptography where such
situations have been in the center of attention for many
years (cf. zero-knowledge, composability) and where a
suitable notion of security, known as the real/ideal-world
paradigm, has been firmly established.
In this paradigm we first define an ideal situation
in which everything is computed perfectly and securely
and call this the ideal functionality. Informally, a two-
party protocol is secure if it looks to the outside world
just like the ideal functionality it is supposed to im-
plement. More concretely, a protocol is deemed se-
cure if for every adversarial strategy, or real adver-
sary, there exists an ideal adversary interacting only
with the ideal functionality such that the execution of
the protocol in the real world is indistinguishable from
this ideal world. If such a security guarantee holds,
it is clear that a secure protocol can be treated as a
call to the ideal functionality and hence, it is possible
to construct and prove secure more complicated proto-
cols in a modular fashion. See [Can00, Can96, Gol04]
and [Unr04, Unr10, BM04, FS09] for further information
about this concept of security in the context of classical
and quantum protocols, respectively.
There exist different meaningful ways to make the
above informal notion of the real/ideal-world paradigm
precise. All these notions have in common that the exe-
cution of the protocol by the honest and dishonest play-
ers is modeled by a completely positive trace-preserving
(CPTP) map. Likewise, every ideal adversary interact-
ing with the ideal functionality is composed out of CPTP
maps modeling the pre- and postprocessing of the in- and
outputs to the ideal functionality (which is a CPTP map
itself). A desirable notion of security is the following:
for every real adversary there exists an ideal adversary,
such that the corresponding CPTP maps are (approxi-
mately) indistinguishable. The natural measure of dis-
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FIG. 1: Illustration of the security definition. A protocol is
secure against Bob, if the real protocol (left) can be simulated
as an interaction with the ideal functionality F (right).
tinguishability of CPTP maps in this context is the dia-
mond norm, since it can be viewed as the maximal bias
of distinguishing real and ideal world by supplying in-
puts to the CPTP maps and attempting to distinguish
the outputs by measurements (i.e. by interacting with an
environment). This rather strong notion of security nat-
urally embeds into a composable framework for security
in which also quantum key distribution can be proven
secure (see e.g. [CKR09]).
Since our goal is the establishment of a no-go theo-
rem, we consider a notion of security which is weaker
than the above in two respects. First, we do not allow
the environment to supply an arbitrary input state but
only the purification of a classical input (see definition of
ρUV R below), and second, we consider a different order
of quantifiers: instead of “∀ real adversary ∃ ideal adver-
sary ∀ input, the output states are indistinguishable” as
a security requirement we only require “∀ real adversary
∀ input ∃ ideal adversary, the outputs states are indis-
tinguishable.” This notion of security is closely related
to notions of security considered in [FS09, Unr10] and is
further discussed in the appendix.
We will now give a formal definition of security. Fol-
lowing the notation of [FS09], we denote by A and B the
real honest Alice and Bob and add a prime to denote dis-
honest players A′,B′ and a hat for the ideal versions Aˆ, Bˆ.
The CPTP map corresponding to the protocol for honest
Alice and dishonest Bob is denoted by piA,B′ . Both honest
and dishonest players obtain an input, in Alice’s case u
(in register U) and in Bob’s case v (in register V ) drawn
from the joint distribution p(u, v). The output state of
the protocol, augmented by the reference R, takes the
form idR ⊗ piA,B′(ρUV R), where ρUV R is a purification of∑
u,v p(u, v)|u〉〈u|U |v〉〈v|V .
Since we are faced with the task of the secure eval-
uation of a classical deterministic function, we con-
sider an ideal functionality F which measures the
inputs in registers U˜ and V˜ and outputs orthogo-
nal states in registers X˜ and Y˜ that correspond to
the function values. Formally, F(|u〉〈u′|U˜ |v〉〈v′|V˜ ) :=
δu,u′δv,v′ |f(u, v)〉〈f(u, v)|X˜ |f(u, v)〉〈f(u, v)|Y˜ , where δ de-
notes the Kronecker delta function. When an ideal hon-
est Aˆ and an ideal adversary Bˆ′ interact with the ideal
3functionality, we denote the joint map by FAˆ,Bˆ′ : UV →
XY ′ (see Figure 1). Aˆ just forwards the in- and outputs
to and from the functionality, whereas Bˆ′ pre- and post-
processes them with CPTP maps Λ1
V→V˜ K and Λ
2
KY˜→Y ′
resulting in a joint map FAˆ,Bˆ′ = [idX˜→X ⊗ Λ2KY˜→Y ′ ] ◦
[FU˜V˜→X˜Y˜ ⊗ idK ] ◦ [idU→U˜ ⊗ Λ1V→V˜ K ], where ◦ denotes
sequential application of CPTP maps.
In the following we let ε ≥ 0 and write ρ ≈ε σ if
C(ρ, σ) ≤ ε. C(ρ, σ) is the purified distance, defined as√
1− F (ρ, σ)2 for F (ρ, σ) := tr√√ρσ√ρ the fidelity.
Definition. A (two-party quantum) protocol pi for f is
ε-correct if for any distribution p(u, v) of the inputs it
holds that
[idR⊗piA,B](ρUV R) ≈ε [idR ⊗FAˆ,Bˆ](ρUV R).
The protocol is ε-secure against dishonest Bob if for any
p(u, v) and for any real adversary B′, there exists an ideal
adversary Bˆ′ such that
[idR⊗piA,B′ ](ρUV R) ≈ε [idR ⊗FAˆ,Bˆ′ ](ρUV R).
ε-security against dishonest Alice is defined analogously.
Since F is classical, we can augment it so that
it outputs v˜ in addition. More precisely, we define
Faug : U˜ V˜ → X˜Y˜ V˜ by Faug(|u〉〈u′|U˜ ⊗ |v〉〈v′|V˜ ) :=
δu,u′δv,v′ |f(u, v)〉〈f(u, v)|X˜ ⊗|f(u, v)〉〈f(u, v)|Y˜ ⊗|v〉〈v|V˜ .
which has the property that F = trV˜ ◦Faug . For a con-
crete input distribution we define σRXV˜ Y ′ := [idR ⊗
FAˆ,Bˆ′,aug ](ρUV R) which satisfies σRXY ′ ≈ε ρRXY ′ for
ρRXY ′ := [idR ⊗ piA,B′ ](ρUV R) if the protocol is secure
against cheating Bob. We call σRXV˜ Y ′ a secure state for
input distribution p(u, v).
Main Results. The proofs of our main results build
upon the following lemma which constructs a cheating
strategy for Alice that works on average over the in-
put distribution p(u, v). Subsequently we will show how
this result can be used to devise a cheating strategy that
works for all distributions at the same time.
Lemma. If a protocol pi for the evaluation of f is ε-
correct and ε-secure against Bob, then for all input dis-
tributions p(u, v) there is a cheating strategy for Alice
such that she obtains v˜ with some probability distribution
q(v˜|u, v) satisfying ∑u,v,v˜ p(u, v)q(v˜|u, v)δf(u,v),f(u,v˜) ≥
1 − 6ε . Furthermore, q(v˜|u, v) is almost independent
of u; i.e., there exists a distribution q˜(v˜|v) such that∑
u,v,v˜ p(u, v)|q(v˜|u, v)− q˜(v˜|v)| ≤ 6ε .
Proof. We first construct a “cheating unitary” T for Alice
and then show how Alice can use it to cheat successfully.
Let Alice and Bob play honestly but let them purify
their protocol with purifying registers X ′1 and Y
′
1 respec-
tively. We assume without loss of generality that honest
parties measure their classical input and hence, X ′1 and
Y ′1 contain copies of u and v, respectively. We denote by
|Φ〉RXX′1Y ′1Y the state of all registers at the end of the
protocol. Notice that tracing out X ′1 from |Φ〉RXX′1Y ′1Y
results in a state trX′1 |Φ〉〈Φ|RXX′1Y ′1Y = ρRXY ′1Y which
is exactly the final state when Alice played honestly and
Bob played dishonestly with the following strategy: he
plays the honest but purified strategy and outputs the
purification of the protocol (register Y ′1) and the output
values f(u, v) (register Y ). His combined dishonest reg-
ister is Y ′ = Y ′1Y . Since the protocol is ε-secure against
Bob by assumption, there exists a secure state σRXV˜ Y ′
satisfying
σRXY ′ ≈ε ρRXY ′ . (1)
Let |Ψ〉RXPV˜ Y ′ be a purification of σRXV˜ Y ′ with puri-
fying register P . Note that |Ψ〉RXPV˜ Y ′ is also a purifi-
cation of σRXY ′ , this time with purifying registers PV˜ .
Recall that |Φ〉RXX′1Y ′ purifies ρRXY ′ with purifying reg-
ister X ′1. Since σRXY ′ ≈ε ρRXY ′ we can use Uhlmann’s
theorem [Uhl76] to conclude that there exists an isometry
T ≡ TX′1→PV˜ (with induced CPTP map T ≡ TX′1→PV˜ )
such that
[TX′1→PV˜ ⊗ idRXY ′ ](|Φ〉〈Φ|RXX′1Y ′) ≈ε |Ψ〉〈Ψ|RXPV˜ Y ′ .
(2)
This concludes the construction of T ≡ TX′1→PV˜ .
We will now show how Alice can use the isometry T to
cheat. Notice that tracing out Y ′1 from |Φ〉RXX′1Y Y ′1 re-
sults exactly in the final state when Bob played honestly
and Alice played dishonestly with the following strategy:
she plays the honest but purified strategy and outputs the
purification of the protocol (register X ′1) and the output
values f(u, v) (register X). She then applies TX′1→PV˜ ,
measures register V˜ in the computational basis and ob-
tains a value v˜. It remains to argue that Alice can com-
pute f(u, v) with good probability based on the value v˜
that she has obtained from measuring register V˜ .
LetMRV˜ X be the CPTP map that measures registers
R,X and V˜ in the computational basis. Tracing over
PY ′ and applyingMRV˜ X on both sides of Equation (2),
we find
[MRXV˜ ⊗ trPY ′ ]([TX′1→PV˜ ⊗ idRXY ′ ](|Φ〉〈Φ|RXX′1Y ′))
≈ε [MRXV˜ ⊗ trPY ′ ](|Ψ〉〈Ψ|RXPV˜ Y ′) (3)
by the monotonicity of the purified distance under CPTP
maps. The right-hand side of Equation (3) equals∑
u,v,v˜
p(u, v)q˜(v˜|v)|uv〉〈uv|R ⊗ |v˜〉〈v˜|V˜ ⊗ |f(u, v˜)〉〈f(u, v˜)|X ,
for some probability distribution q˜(v˜|v) that is condi-
tioned only on Bob’s input v, since |Ψ〉RXPV˜ Y ′ is a pu-
rification of the secure state σRXV˜ Y ′ . The left-hand side
4of Equation (3) equals∑
u,v,v˜,x
p(u, v)q(v˜|u, v)|uv〉〈uv|R ⊗ |v˜〉〈v˜|V˜
⊗ r(x|u, v, v˜)|x〉〈x|X
(4)
for some conditional probability distributions q(v˜|u, v)
and r(x|u, v, v˜). Because of the correctness of the pro-
tocol, term (4) is ε-close to∑
u,v,v˜
p(u, v)q¯(v˜|u, v)|uv〉〈uv|R⊗|v˜〉〈v˜|V˜⊗|f(u, v)〉〈f(u, v)|X
(5)
for some conditional probability distribution q¯(v˜|u, v).
Noting that the ε-closeness of (4) and (5) implies that
p(·, ·)q(·|·, ·) and p(·, ·)q¯(·|·, ·) (when interpreted as quan-
tum states) are ε-close in purified distance, we can re-
place p(·, ·)q¯(·|·, ·) in (5) by p(·, ·)q(·|·, ·) increasing the
purified distance to the left-hand side of Equation (3)
only to 2ε. Putting things together, Equation (3) im-
plies∑
u,v,v˜
p(u, v)q(v˜|u, v)|uv〉〈uv|R |v˜〉〈v˜|V˜ |f(u, v)〉〈f(u, v)|X
(6)
≈3ε
∑
u,v,v˜
p(u, v)q˜(v˜|v)|uv〉〈uv|R |v˜〉〈v˜|V˜ |f(u, v˜)〉〈f(u, v˜)|X .
Sandwiching both sides with tr[Z·], where Z =∑
u,v,v˜ |uv〉〈uv|R⊗|v˜〉〈v˜|V˜ ⊗|f(u, v˜)〉〈f(u, v˜)|X we find the
first claim since the purified distance of two distributions
upper bounds their total variation distance and since the
latter does not increase under tr[Z·]. The second claim
follows similarly by tracing out register X from Equa-
tion (6).
Applying the lemma to the uniform distribution we
immediately obtain our impossibility result for perfectly
secure protocols.
Theorem 1. Let pi be a protocol for the evaluation of
f which is perfectly correct and perfectly secure (ε = 0)
against Bob. Then, if Bob has input v, Alice can compute
f(u, v) for all u.
We note that this implies that Alice can completely
break the security for any non-trivial function f .
Proof. Letting p(u, v) = 1|U ||V | and ε = 0 in the lemma
results in the statement that if Alice has input u0, then
she will obtain v˜ from the distribution q(v˜|u0, v) which
equals q˜(v˜|v). But since also q(v˜|u, v) = q˜(v˜|v) for all u,
we have 1|U ||V |
∑
u,v,v˜ q(v˜|u0, v)δf(u,v),f(u,v˜) = 1. In other
words, all v˜ that occur (i.e. that have q˜(v˜|v) > 0) satisfy
for all u, f(u, v) = f(u, v˜). Alice can therefore compute
the function for all u.
The impossibility result for the case of imperfect pro-
tocols is also based on the lemma, but requires a subtle
swap in the order of quantifiers (from “∀ input ∃ ideal ad-
versary” to “∃ ideal adversary ∀ input”) which we achieve
by use of von Neumann’s minimax theorem.
Theorem 2. If a protocol pi for the evaluation of f is
ε-correct and ε-secure against Bob, then there is a cheat-
ing strategy for Alice (where she uses input u0 while
Bob has input v) which gives her v˜ distributed accord-
ing to some distribution Q(v˜|u0, v) such that for all u:
Prv˜∼Q[f(u, v) = f(u, v˜)] ≥ 1− 28ε.
Proof. The argument is inspired by [DKSW07]. For a
finite set S, we denote by ∆(S) the simplex of prob-
ability distributions over S. Denote by W the set of
pairs (u, v). Consider a finite ε-net D of ∆(W) in to-
tal variation distance; and to each distribution in D
the corresponding cheating unitary T constructed in
the proof of the lemma. We collect all these uni-
taries in the (finite) set E and assume that T deter-
mines p uniquely, as we could include the value p into
T . For each such T , let q(v˜|u, v, T ) and q˜(v˜|v, T ) be
the distributions from the lemma. Define the pay-
off function g(u, v, T ) :=
∑
v˜ q(v˜|u, v, T )δf(u,v),f(u,v˜) −∑
v˜ |q(v˜|u, v, T ) − q˜(v˜|v, T )|. The lemma then yields
1− 12ε ≤ minp∈DmaxT∈E
∑
u,v p(u, v)g(u, v, T ) which is
at most 2ε+ minp′∈∆(W) maxT∈E
∑
u,v p
′(u, v)g(u, v, T ),
since replacing p by p′ incurs only an overall change
in the value by 2ε (as −1 ≤ g(u, v, T ) ≤ 1) . By
von Neumann’s minimax theorem, this last term equals
2ε+ maxp′′∈∆(E) min(u,v)∈W
∑
T g(u, v, T )p
′′(T ) [20].
Hence, we have shown that there is a strategy for Alice,
where she chooses her cheating unitary T with probabil-
ity p′′(T ), such that (for some ε1 + ε2 ≤ 14ε) for all u, v,∑
v˜
Q(v˜|u, v)δf(u,v),f(u,v˜) ≥ 1− ε1 (7)
and
∑
v˜ |Q(v˜|u, v) − Q˜(v˜|v)| ≤
∑
v˜,T p(T )|q(v˜|u, v, T ) −
q˜(v˜|v, T )| ≤ ε2, where Q(v˜|u, v) :=
∑
T p(T )q(v˜|u, v, T )
and Q˜(v˜|v) := ∑T p(T )q˜(v˜|v, T ). This implies that for
all u, v,
∑
v˜ |Q(v˜|u0, v) − Q(v˜|u, v)| ≤ 2ε2 . Combining
this inequality with Equation (7), we find for all u, v,∑
v˜ Q(v˜|u0, v)δf(u,v),f(u,v˜) ≥ 1− ε1 − 2ε2 ≥ 1− 28ε .
One might wonder whether Theorem 2 can be
strengthened to obtain, with probability 1 − O(ε), a v˜
such that for all u : f(u, v) = f(u, v˜). It turns out
that this depends on the function f : when f is equal-
ity [EQ(u, v) = 1 iff u = v] and inner-product modulo
2 [IP(u, v) =
∑
i ui · vi mod 2], the stronger conclusion
is possible. However for disjointness [DISJ(u, v) = 0 iff
∃i : ui = vi = 1] such a strengthening is not possible
showing that our result is tight in general.
For EQ, we reason as follows. Set u = v in
Theorem 2. Alice is able to sample a v˜ such
5that
∑
v˜ Q(v˜|u0, v)δEQ(v,v),EQ(v,v˜) ≥ 1 − 28ε. Since
δEQ(v,v),EQ(v,v˜) = 1 iff v = v˜, Q(v|u0, v) ≥ 1 − 28ε.
When f is IP, we pick u uniform at random and obtain∑
v˜ Q(v˜|u0, v)(2−n
∑
u δIP(u,v),IP(u,v˜)) ≥ 1 − 28ε. Using
2−n
∑
u δIP(u,v),IP(u,v˜) = 1 if v˜ = v, and
1
2 if v˜ 6= v, we
find Q(v|u0, v) + 12 (1−Q(v|u0, v)) ≥ 1− 28ε, which im-
plies Q(v|u0, v) ≥ 1 − 56ε. Interestingly, for DISJ such
an argument is not possible. Assume that we have a
protocol that is ε-secure against Bob. Bob could now
run the protocol normally on strings v with Hamming
weight |v| ≤ n/2, but on inputs v with |v| > n/2 he
could flip, at random,
√
n of v’s bits that are 1. It is
not hard to see that this new protocol is still ε-secure
and ε+O( 1√
n
)-correct. The loss in the correctness is due
to the fact that, on high Hamming-weight strings, the
protocol may, with a small probability, not be correct.
On the other hand, on high-Hamming-weight inputs, the
protocol can not transmit or leak the complete input v
to Alice, simply because Bob does not use it.
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Appendix: Additional Comments about the Security
Definition
Since this work presents impossibility results for the
secure computation of f , one may wonder how the results
are affected when the notions of security are weakened.
In particular, one may ask whether similar results can be
obtained when, instead of the real/ideal-world paradigm,
notions of security more akin to the ones used in the
well-known no-go proofs for bit commitment and one-
sided computation would be used. Whereas we do not
know the answer to this question in general, we wish to
emphasize the difficulty in formalizing such notions of
security satisfactorily.
With regards to the real/ideal-world paradigm we will
now comment on some specific notions of security used
in this work. A central object in the real/ideal-world
paradigm is the ideal functionality. Since we are faced
with the task of the secure evaluation of a classical deter-
ministic function, we chose to consider an ideal function-
ality which measures the inputs it receives and outputs
orthogonal states to the parties that correspond to the
function values. Note that in certain situations one may
be satisfied with different (possibly weaker) ideal func-
tionalities for this task; we leave open the question to
what extend our results remain valid in such situations.
One may also wonder whether the purification of the
inputs could not be omitted. Note that such an omission
would correspond to a serious limitation of the environ-
ment to distinguish the real and from the ideal world.
With respect to the stronger notion of security discussed
in the main text, for instance, there can be a large dif-
ference between the diamond norm (which corresponds
to purified inputs) and the induced norm (where the
maximisation is over inputs that are not purified), see
e.g. [DKSW07]. This difference does not occur in the
case of perfectly secure protocols, where one can there-
fore omit the reference. The omission of the reference
has a more serious effect on the weaker notion of security
considered in this work, even in the case of perfect secu-
rity, since we only consider (purified) classical inputs; in
fact, omission would invalidate the no-go result as we will
now show. We leave it as an open question whether The-
orem 2 can be proven were arbitrary (unpurified) inputs
considered.
The following example was suggested to us by an
anonymous referee and shows the necessity of requiring
the register R in our security definition. Consider the
classical deterministic function f((s0, s1), b) = (b, sb) of
n-bit strings s0, s1 and a choice bit b which is inspired
by a one-out-of-two-string-oblivious transfer but outputs
both the choice bit and the string of choice to both Alice
and Bob. Let us consider the following protocol piA,B:
Bob sends b to Alice and Alice responds with sb.
Clearly, this protocol is secure against cheating Bob,
who learns no more than either s0 or s1. One might also
think that this protocol is perfectly secure against cheat-
ing Alice because Alice learns Bob’s choice bit anyway.
Indeed, if we defined security without purifying register
R one could construct an ideal adversary Alice Aˆ′ from
any real adversary A′ as follows. Let Aˆ′ simulate two in-
dependent copies of A′ and give b = 0 to the first and
b = 1 to the second copy which both respond with a
string s0 and s1, respectively. Let Aˆ
′ input these two
strings (s0, s1) into the ideal functionality F and receive
(b, sb) as output from F . Output whatever the real copy
of A′ corresponding to the bit b outputs (and discard
the other copy). This simulation generates an output
in the ideal world which is identically distributed to the
one from the real protocol. Hence, the protocol would
be perfectly secure against Alice. Notice that this exam-
ple shows that an analogue of our Theorem 1 cannot be
proven for this weaker security definition.
We stress that the above protocol is not secure accord-
ing to our security definition by virtue of the purifying
register R. Consider the uniform input distribution over
n-bit strings (s0, s1) in the 2n-qubit register U and the
choice bit b in register V . Hence, the input state ρRUV
if fully entangled between R and UV . Let us consider
6the following real adversary A′ who measures the first
n qubits of U in the computational basis in case b = 0
or performs the measurement in the Hadamard basis if
b = 1 and returns the measurement outcome as sb. Due
to the entanglement, the first n qubits of R collapse to the
measured state. Notice that for this adversary A′, the ar-
gument above is no longer applicable, because Aˆ′ cannot
simulate two independent copies of A′ as the U register is
only available once. In fact, for this adversarial strategy
A′, only one of the two strings s0, s1 is well-defined as the
other string corresponds to the measurement outcome in
a complementary basis of the same quantum state. This
highlights the intuitive security problem of the suggested
protocol, namely that it is not guaranteed that both s0
and s1 classically exist for a cheating Alice. This shows
that the protocol is not secure against cheating Alice and
that it therefore does not stand in contradiction with our
results.
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